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Pollution Problems in Paradise: Does the Clean Water Act Apply to 
Groundwater Pollution in Maui? 
Hawaii Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui 
Brett Smith 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Living on an island certainly limits the available wastewater disposal 
options. The County of Maui (“the County”)1 in Hawaii eliminates 
wastewater for a population of approximately 163,000,2 in addition to many 
visiting tourists every year. The County partially achieves this by processing 
wastewater at the Lahaina Wastewater Reclamation Facility (“LWRF”).3 The 
LWRF serves a fluctuating population of about 40,000 people in the Lahaina 
area, a former whaling center and current resort community on the west side 
of Maui.4 The facility processes three to five million gallons of the island’s 
wastewater daily, filtering and disinfecting it before sending the treated 
effluent into injection wells that lead into a groundwater aquifer underneath 
the facility.5  
However, in the past 25 years studies have determined that the 
discharged effluent migrates from the aquifer into the Pacific Ocean, where it 
is causing damage to the local coral reefs.6 The plaintiffs in Hawaii Wildlife 
Fund v. County of Maui argue this violates the Clean Water Act of 1972 
(“CWA”), which Congress passed with the intent of restoring and 
maintaining the “chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s 
                                                
1 The County of Maui includes Maui and the smaller islands of Molokai, Lanai, and 
Kahoolawe. THE COUNTY OF MAUI, http://co.maui.hi.us/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2015).The 
County of Maui includes Maui and the smaller islands of Molokai, Lanai, and Kahoolawe. 
THE COUNTY OF MAUI, http://co.maui.hi.us/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2015). 
2 UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/15/15009.html 
(last visited Apr. 26, 2015). 
3 Haw. Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui, 24 F. Supp. 3d 980, 983 (D. Haw. 2014). 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
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waters.”7 The CWA prohibits the discharge of any pollutants into navigable 
waters from any point source.8 Any such discharge requires a National 
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”) permit to avoid running 
afoul of the CWA.9 The County conceded that it discharged pollutants (i.e., 
the treated effluent) from a point source (i.e., the injection wells).10 But the 
County maintains that groundwater in the aquifer does not qualify as 
navigable waters.11  
The defendant and the United States District Court for the District of 
Hawaii each came up with a test to determine if the groundwater fits the 
definition of “navigable waters.” The County proposed that the aquifer must 
have both “a direct and immediate hydrological connection to the ocean” and 
“significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the 
ocean’s waters.”12 The court took a slightly different approach, creating the 
“conduit” test.13 Under this theory, the plaintiff could prevail if the discharge 
of pollutants into the groundwater is “functionally equivalent to a discharge 
into the ocean itself.”14 Applying either test, the court found that the County 
violated the CWA.15  
The decision expanded the parameters of the CWA in a way that 
effectively advances the act’s purpose. However, the issue is far from settled. 
The court broke new ground with its decision, but it admittedly could not cite 
a controlling appellate decision or statute allowing the conduit theory.16 After 
the decision, the County remained defiant. Faced with the disposal of three to 
five million gallons of wastewater per day, the County has continued to use 
the LWRF as it awaits a decision on its NPDES permit.  
                                                
7 Id.; 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)) (2012). 
8 Haw. Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui, 24 F. Supp. 3d 984, 985 (D. Haw. 2014); 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1362(12)) (2012). 
9 Haw. Wildlife Fund, 24 F. Supp. 3d at 983. 
10 Id. at 983-84. 
11 Id. at 983, 998-99. 
12 Id. at 989 (internal quotes omitted). 
13 Id. at 994. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 1005. 
16 Id. at 996. 
POLLUTION PROBLEMS IN PARADISE 
294 
 
 
II. FACTS AND HOLDING 
Every day, the Lahaina Wastewater Reclamation Facility (“LWRF”), 
operated by the County of Maui (“the County”) on the west side of the 
Hawaiian island, receives four million gallons of sewage from a system that 
serves approximately 40,000 people.17 The facility processes the sewage, and 
sends the treated effluent18 into four injection wells.19 From there, the 
effluent travels 200 feet down into a shallow groundwater aquifer.20 Effluent 
from Wells 3 and 4, which receive 80 percent of all effluent, eventually finds 
its way into the Pacific Ocean, a half mile-away through submarine springs 
off the shore of Kahekili Beach.21 A joint study conducted by the 
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), the Hawaii Department of 
Health (“DOH”), the U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development 
Center, and University of Hawaii researchers concluded that 64 percent of the 
effluent from those wells reaches the ocean about three months later.22 The 
research confirmed the findings of previous studies, including one conducted 
by the County in 1991.23  
Discharging effluent into the ocean without a National Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”) permit violates the Clean Water 
Act (“CWA”), and the plaintiffs, Hawaii Wildlife Fund, Sierra Club, 
Surfrider Foundation, and West Maui Preservation Association, brought 
suit.24 The plaintiffs claim the discharge significantly affects the “chemical, 
physical, and biological integrity of the nearshore water” and specifically cite 
elevated temperatures and levels of inorganic nitrogen and phosphorus, and 
                                                
17 Id. at 984. 
18 The County preferred the term “effluent” or “reclaimed water” and objected to the use of 
the term “wastewater,” citing concerns of prejudice. The court noted that “wastewater” had 
been used throughout litigation and that the “W” in “LWRF” stands for “wastewater.” 
However, the court acknowledged that the treated water is more potable than the name 
connotes, and may even be safe to drink. But the court found that regardless of what the 
treated water was called, it had no effect on any of the County’s arguments. Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 984. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 983. 
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low pH levels and salinity.25 The plaintiffs’ experts claim these alterations 
contribute to the destruction of coral and could prevent reef growth.26  
The defendant, the County of Maui, applied for an NPDES permit, 
submitting its application in November 2012, after the plaintiffs filed suit.27 
The County moved to dismiss or stay the case while the EPA and DOH 
decided whether to issue the permit.28 The defendant challenged the 
credibility and statements made by plaintiff’s experts.29 The County’s expert 
also disputed the danger to the reef, stating that upon inspection “all reef 
areas appeared essentially pristine.”30 But the court dismissed those 
objections.31  
According to the court, which adopted language from a Ninth Circuit 
decision,32 the County needed an NPDES permit when it discharges a 
pollutant into navigable waters from a point source.33 The County argued that 
“navigable waters” under the CWA must have both “a direct and immediate 
hydrological connection to the ocean and significantly affect the chemical, 
physical, and biological integrity of the ocean waters.”34 The County argued 
the EPA and DOH should determine this.35 But the court found itself 
competent to judge the case and stated that if the court required an NPDES 
permit, that decision would supersede a final decision by the EPA and 
DOH.36 The plaintiffs agreed that the County’s two-part test for navigable 
waters was a reasonable interpretation of the standard the plaintiffs must 
meet.37 But the court went further and said the plaintiffs also may prevail if 
                                                
25 Id. at 984-85. 
26 Id. at 985. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 986. 
29 Id. at 987. 
30 Id. at 985. 
31 Id. at 987. 
32 Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d 526 (9th Cir. 2001). 
33 Haw. Wildlife Fund, 24 F. Supp. 3d at 988-89 (quoting Headwaters, 243 F.3d at 532). 
34 Haw. Wildlife Fund, 24 F. Supp. 3d at 989 (internal quotes omitted) (emphasis added). 
35 Id.  
36 Id. at 989-91. 
37 Id. at 994. 
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they could show that the “discharge into the groundwater below the LWRF is 
functionally equivalent to a discharge into the ocean itself.”  
The District Court denied the County’s motion for stay or dismissal 
and granted the plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment.38 The court 
held that discharging, without a permit, more than a de minimis amount of 
pollutants into groundwater that serves as a conduit to navigable-in-fact water 
is a violation of the CWA.39 The court also found that the defendant would 
not prevail under its own proposed two-part test, holding that when 
discharged pollutants eventually flow into protected waters and undisputed 
evidence exists that the discharge significantly affects the physical, chemical 
and biological integrity of those waters, the plaintiffs fall under the purview 
of the CWA.40  
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Congress enacted the Clean Water Act of 1972 (“CWA”) as a means 
of restoring and maintaining the “chemical, physical, and biological integrity 
of the Nation’s waters.”41 As per this goal, the CWA prohibits the discharge 
of pollutants unless the discharger obtains a National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System (“NPDES”) permit.42 A NPDES permit is required when 
there is a discharge of a pollutant into navigable waters from any point 
source.43  
                                                
38 Id. at 983. 
39 Id. at 996.  
40 Id. at 1000. 
41 Id. at 986 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012)). 
42 See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2012); 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2012). The plurality in Rapanos v. 
United States stated that the discharge of pollutants includes “the addition of any pollutant to 
navigable waters.” 547 U.S. 715, 743 (2006). 
43 Haw. Wildlife Fund, 24 F. Supp.  3d at 988-89 (quoting Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent 
Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d 526, 532 (9th Cir. 2001). In order to clarify the scope of this rule, 
these terms of art need further exploration. “Discharge of pollutants” means “any addition of 
any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (2012). The 
CWA defines a “pollutant” as “dredged spoil, solid waste, incinerator residue, sewage, 
garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemical wastes, biological materials, radioactive 
materials, heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and industrial, 
municipal, and agricultural waste discharged into the water.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (2012). A 
“point source” is “any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not 
limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling 
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The CWA defines navigable waters broader than traditional 
definitions, subjugating some waters to regulation that would not typically be 
classified as “navigable.”44 In Rapanos v. United States, the Supreme Court 
was split 4-4-1 on whether the CWA applied to wetlands adjacent to 
tributaries of navigable-in-fact waters.45 The four justices in the plurality 
described navigable waters under the CWA as “those relatively permanent, 
standing or continuously flowing bodies of water ‘forming geographic 
features,’” meaning streams, oceans, rivers, lakes and the like, and not 
including wetlands adjacent to tributaries.46 Justice Kennedy, concurring, 
developed a “significant nexus” test, in which waters would be considered 
“navigable” if they “either alone or in combination with similarly situated 
lands in the region, significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological 
integrity of other covered waters more readily understood as navigable.”47 
Kennedy stated that “hydrological linkage” that is “speculative or 
insubstantial” is not enough to establish a nexus; instead there must be a 
“reasonable inference of ecological interconnection” with navigable-in-fact 
water.48  
The Ninth Circuit in Northern California River Watch v. City of 
Healdsburg applied the “significant nexus” standard to a rock quarry that fed 
pollutants into a river through surface wetlands and an underground aquifer.49 
The court in Healdsburg found that a significant nexus existed. In the instant 
case, the plaintiffs and defendants read a two-part test into the court’s 
decision in Healdsburg, stating that to fall under the CWA’s jurisdiction, the 
                                                                                                                     
stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which 
pollutants are or may be discharged.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2012). 
44 Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 731; Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Eng’rs., 531 U.S. 159, 167 (2001) (quoting U.S. v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 
121, 133 (1985)). “Navigable waters” are “waters of the United States, including the 
territorial seas.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2012). 
45 Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 743. 
46 Id. at 739 (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2992 (2d ed.)). 
47 Id. at 780. 
48 Id. at 780, 784-85. 
49 N. Cal.  River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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plaintiffs must show (1) a hydrological connection exists between the 
groundwater and the ocean and (2) a significant impact results.50  
The CWA specifically excludes agricultural stormwater discharges 
and return flows from irrigated agriculture, but it does not mention any 
exclusion for groundwater.51 Federal courts in other jurisdictions also have 
held that groundwater falls under the scope of the CWA when it carries 
pollutants into other bodies of water.52 The Environmental Protection Agency 
(“EPA”) has agreed with this sentiment as well.53 However, the EPA has also 
teamed with the Army Corps of Engineers for a proposed rule that would 
expressly proclaim groundwater not waters of the United States.54 
State and federal agencies work together to enforce the CWA, and a 
state may apply for the authority to issue permits under the act.55 The state of 
Hawaii received its permit in 1974, giving it the primary authority to review 
and approve NPDES permits with oversight from the EPA.56 Hawaii must 
advise the EPA of each NPDES the state plans to issue.57 The EPA may 
object to and raise concerns about any permit, and authority over the permits 
reverts back to the EPA if the state does not properly address the concerns.58 
If a court requires an NPDES permit, neither the EPA nor the Department of 
Health (“DOH”) can supersede the decision and rule that a permit is not 
                                                
50 Haw. Wildlife Fund, 24 F. Supp. 3d at 994. 
51 Id. at 995. 
52 See Williams Pipe Line Co. v. Bayer Corp., 964 F. Supp. 3d 1300, 1319-20 (S.D. Iowa 
1997); Wash. Wilderness Coal. v. Hecla Min. Co., 870 F. Supp. 3d 983, 990 (E.D. Wash. 
1994). 
53 National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Regulation and Effluent 
Limitations Guidelines and Standards for Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, 
Proposed Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. 2960 (Jan. 12, 2001) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 12, 412). 
54 Definition of "Waters of the United States" under the Clean Water Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 
22188 (Apr. 21, 2014) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328, 40 C.F.R. pts. 110, 112, 116-17, 
122, 230, 232, 300, 302, 401). 
55 Haw. Wildlife Fund, 24 F. Supp. 3d at 986; 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2012). 
56 Hawaii's Application To Administer the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
(NPDES) Pretreatment Program, Proposed Rule, 48 Fed. Reg. 15662 (Apr. 12, 1983); Nat’l 
Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 650 (2007). 
57 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(1), (2) (2012). 
58 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(d)(1)-(2), (4) (2012). 
JOURNAL OF ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY LAW VOL. 22, NO. 2 
 299 
required.59 If the EPA and DOH require an NPDES permit, then the 
defendant could be liable for civil penalties.60  
IV. INSTANT DECISION 
Both parties in the case agreed that the Lahaina Wastewater 
Reclamation Facility (“LWRF”) discharged a pollutant from a point source.61 
But the plaintiffs and the County of Maui differed on whether the facility 
discharged the effluent into “navigable waters” as defined by the Clean 
Water Act (“CWA”).62 The County also argued that the aquifer receiving the 
effluents must have a “direct and immediate hydrological connection” and 
significantly affect its chemical, physical, and biological integrity.63  
The court in this case relies partly on Justice Kennedy’s “significance 
nexus” test in the Rapanos v. United States64 concurrence.65 The Ninth 
Circuit previously also applied the “significance nexus” test in deciding 
Northern California River Watch v. City of Healdsburg,66 holding that a 
sufficient enough relationship existed between two bodies of water in that 
case.67 The court in the instant case stated that the plaintiffs could prevail if 
they proved that the discharge into the aquifer was “functionally equivalent 
to a discharge into the ocean itself.”68 In other words, even if the groundwater 
                                                
59 Haw. Wildlife Fund, 24 F. Supp. 3d at 991; see also Ass'n to Protect Hammersley v. 
Taylor Res., 299 F.3d 1007, 1009, 2002 (9th Cir. 2002). 
60 Haw. Wildlife Fund, 24 F. Supp. 3d at 991; see also Chafin v. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. 1017 
(2013). 
61 Haw. Wildlife Fund, 24 F. Supp. 3d at 989. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. The County also argued that the Hawaii Department of Health (“DOH”) and the 
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) were better suited to decide these matters and 
had primary jurisdiction in this case. The County asked for a judgment on the pleadings or, 
in the alternative, a stay to allow this. However, the court rejected the request stating it had 
the authority and competence to address the matter. Id. at 989-92. 
64 Rapanos v. U.S., 547 U.S. 715 (2006). 
65 Haw. Wildlife Fund, 24 F. Supp. 3d at 994. 
66 N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d at 999-1000 (9th Cir. 2007). 
67 Haw. Wildlife Fund, 24 F. Supp. 3d at 994. 
68 Id. 
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in the aquifer was not itself protected by the CWA, liability would still arise 
if the aquifer acted as a conduit to navigable-in-fact waters.69  
Referring back to Rapanos, the court stated a pollutant need not be 
added directly to navigable water, but may pass through conveyances in 
between.70 The court did not distinguish between groundwater and surface 
water conveyances, stating that either can act as a “conduit through which 
pollutants reach the ocean.”71 Failing to regulate tributaries to a river or 
groundwater flowing into the ocean could lead to these waters being used as 
“open sewers as far as federal regulation was concerned.”72 The court cited 
persuasive case law in several other jurisdictions73 that found that the 
addition of effluents to groundwater subjects an entity to regulation and the 
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”) permit.74 The 
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) has also determined that 
pollutants conveyed by surface or groundwater can subject a discharger of 
effluents to the CWA’s jurisdiction.75 
The court emphasized that groundwater is not always considered part 
of navigable waters.76 A discharge of pollutants that never eventually 
migrates into navigable-in-fact waters does not violate the CWA.77 The court 
acknowledged a split in authority about whether groundwater may or may not 
be regulated.78 But the court found that almost every decision that held that 
groundwater was not protected by the CWA was based on those courts’ 
determination that the groundwater itself was not navigable water.79 Those 
                                                
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 995. 
71 Id.  
72 Id. at 995 (quoting U.S. v Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317, 1326 (6th Cir. 
1974)). 
73 Id. Including the Sixth Circuit, the Southern District of Iowa, and the Eastern District of 
Washington.  Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 995-96; see National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Regulation and 
Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, 
66 Fed. Reg. 2960-01, 3017 (proposed Jan. 12, 2001). 
76 Haw. Wildlife Fund, 24 F. Supp. 3d at 996. 
77 Id. For example, if a party only released rocks or other fill material that did not cause 
pollutants to migrate through groundwater. Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
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courts did not consider whether the groundwater acted as a conduit to 
navigable-in-fact waters.80 The plaintiffs also limited their argument to 
restricting effluents that pollute the ocean through the groundwater as 
opposed to a blanket statement that groundwater deserves wholesale 
ecological protection.81 
In this case, the court said that the plaintiffs showed that pollutants 
are directly traced from the LWRF to the ocean, and that the level of 
pollutants emerging in the ocean is more than de minimis.82 The plaintiffs 
established this through the Tracer Dye Study conducted by the EPA, the 
Department of Health, the U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development 
Center, and researchers at the University of Hawaii.83 The Tracer Dye Study 
found that 64 percent of treated wastewater from two of the LWRF’s four 
injection wells found its way into the ocean.84 Because those wells receive 
more than 80 percent of all the wastewater treated at the facility, the study 
determined that more than 50 percent of the wastewater the LWRF 
discharged reached the ocean.85 The County admits that pollutants from the 
plant reach the ocean but disputed the numbers in the study.86 However, the 
County gave no reason or evidence to support its claim.87  
The County also argued that the aquifer could not be viewed as a 
conduit because of the diffusive effects of deep groundwater.88 The County 
argued that a conduit must confine or contain the water.89 However, the court 
stated that the County was confusing a “conduit” with a “point source,” and 
not all conduits need to be point sources.90 The court found that “[a]ny 
conveyance that transmits such a high proportion of a pollutant from one 
place to another is consistent with being ‘confined and discrete,’ irrespective 
                                                
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 997. 
82 Id. at 997-98. 
83 Id. at 983-84, 998. 
84 Id. at 998. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 998-99. 
90 Id. 
POLLUTION PROBLEMS IN PARADISE 
302 
 
of its other geologic properties.”91 The court also rejected the County’s 
distinction between deep and shallow groundwater, noting “[n]either logic 
nor case law” supports that distinction and that determinations about whether 
groundwater reaches navigable-in-fact water should be made on a case-by-
case basis.92 
The court further found that requiring a finding of a significant impact 
on the physical, biological, and chemical integrity of the ocean would limit 
regulation regarding groundwater.93 The court decided this despite an 
agreement between the two parties that accepted the County’s two-part 
proposed test.94 The CWA’s strict liability scheme “categorically prohibits 
the discharge of pollutants from a point source without a permit” regardless 
of the discharge’s effects.95 The court noted that Congress intended to bar all 
unpermitted discharges when enacting the CWA, and requiring a significant 
impact would undermine that intent.96  
However, even considering the impact of the wastewater on the 
ocean, the court stated that the plaintiffs would still prevail in their action.97 
Numerous studies and reports conducted for more than a decade by a variety 
of scientists and state and federal authorities found that effluent has affected 
the water near the submarine seeps where it is being discharged.98 The 
plaintiffs contend that elevated levels of nitrogen and phosphorus appearing 
near the seeps can accelerate the growth of fleshy seaweed and algae that can 
damage coral.99 The plaintiffs also showed that water near the seeps was 
more acidic than the surrounding water, which reduces the amounts of 
carbonate ions available for corals, mussels, and limpets and promotes the 
                                                
91 Id. at 999 (quoting United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 373 (10th Cir. 
1979)). 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 1004. 
94 Id. at 1000-01. The court stated the parties incorrectly interpreted the test from the 
Healdsburg case but proceeded with the incorrect interpretation as it was central to the 
motion for summary judgment. Id. at 1001. See N.Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg 
496 F.3d 993, 999-1000 (9th Cir. 2007). 
95 Haw. Wildlife Fund, 24 F. Supp. 3d at 997. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 1000. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 1003. 
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growth of seaweed that competes with coral.100 The plaintiffs showed that the 
water near the seeps had lower salinity, which could harm coral.101 Oxygen 
concentrations were also lower, which could suffocate coral and promote the 
growth of seaweed.102 Elevated water temperatures discovered near the seeps 
could also lead to the bleaching and death of coral.103  
The County’s experts attempted to minimize these effects by saying 
that the ocean’s vast size dispersed the effluents and attenuated their effects 
to an insignificant level.104 But the court dismissed this argument, saying that 
there is no basis for the conclusion that the effects must be felt across all the 
nearshore waters.105 The water near the seeps is sufficiently and significantly 
affected.106 
Because the study provides undisputed evidence that the County 
discharged pollutants at the LWRF site that eventually migrated into the 
ocean, and because the County did not have a NPDES permit, the court found 
the County violated the CWA.107 Even applying the significant effects test, 
which the court did reluctantly, the plaintiffs would still prevail as the 
effluents affected the ocean water near the seeps.108 
V. COMMENT 
The immediate impact of the Hawaii District Court decision is that 
the County of Maui (“the County”) has violated the Clean Water Act 
(“CWA”) by discharging pollutants from a point source into navigable 
waters.109 This means that the Lahaina Wastewater Reclamation Facility 
(“LWRF”) must either obtain a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination 
System (“NPDES”) permit or stop pumping millions of gallons of treated 
                                                
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 1003-04. 
105 Id. at 1004. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 1000. 
108 Id. at 1004-05. 
109 Haw. Wildlife Fund, 24 F. Supp. 3d at 1000. 
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wastewater into the aquifer every day. The County decided to do neither. 
Immediately after the court handed down its decision, a County of Maui 
spokesperson released a statement stating that “[a]lthough [the County] 
respects the court’s decision, we are still reviewing the court’s ruling and 
evaluating our options.”110 
While the court found a CWA violation, it did not issue an injunction 
to force the County to comply and made no determinations regarding civil 
damages.111 However, each day since the decision the County has racked up 
massive amounts of fines with its violation. This led the parties back to court 
in January 2015.112 The County wanted the court to re-examine its original 
decision by expanding its argument against the violation.113  Since the court 
had found that Injection Wells 3 and 4 violated the CWA, the County argued 
that it only could be in violation of the CWA if Injection Wells 1 and 2 were 
also found in violation.114 The plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for summary 
judgment arguing Wells 1 and 2 were in violation, and the court agreed.115 
The court applied the same test it used for Wells 3 and 4, and found the only 
point of contention was the point source element.116  The court rejected the 
County’s argument, stating that “[i]t would be nonsensical to regulate a 
polluter that discharges effluent to the ocean through a series of sequential 
point sources, while exempting a polluter that discharges the same effluent 
through a combination of an initial point source and subsequent nonpoint 
sources.”117  
                                                
110 Sophie Cocke, Maui County Faces Millions in Fines for Clean Water Act Violations: 
Federal court rules that Lahaina injection wells are polluting Kahekili Beach Park, 
HONOLULU CIVIL BEAT (June 2, 2014), http://www.civilbeat.com/2014/06/maui-county-
faces-millions-fines-clean-water-act-violations/. 
111 Haw. Wildlife Fund, 24 F. Supp. 3d at 1005. 
112 Anthony Pignataro, Federal Judge again smacks County of Maui with Clean Water Act 
violations, MAUI TIME WEEKLY (February 2, 2015), http://mauitime.com/news/science-and-
environment/federal-judge-smacks-county-maui-clean-water-act-violations/?hvid=LxXUn; 
See Haw. Wildlife Fund v. Cty. of Maui, No. CIV. 12-00198 SOM/BM, 2015 WL 328227 
(D. Haw. Jan. 23, 2015). 
113 Haw. Wildlife Fund, 2015 WL 328227, at *4. 
114 Id. at *5. 
115 Id. at *1. 
116 Id. at *6. 
117 Id.  
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Having lost again, the County said that it was “too early” to talk about 
fines.118 The fines could have been in excess of $100 million.119 The 
plaintiffs, however, are not focused on the imposition of large fines, and 
would rather the money be re-invested into the County rather than go into the 
federal treasury.120 The County reached a settlement with the court on 
September 24, 2015, and agreed to pay a $100,000 penalty and invest $2.5 
million on projects to divert and reuse treated wastewater.121 The goal always 
has been to compel the County to comply with the CWA and protect the 
waters off the Maui shore, not to harshly penalize the County and its 
taxpayers. But the penalties exist as a compliance measure and may be 
necessary given the County’s prolonged reluctance and defiance.122  
As its spokesperson stated, the County still has options that would 
allow the LWRF to continue operating as it is currently. The County had 
already applied for a NPDES permit, 123 and if approved, could continue to 
discharge the effluents into the groundwater. Should this happen, the efforts 
of the plaintiffs will be completely lost. The plaintiffs want to protect the 
waters and the reef, and they have presented to the court studies that clearly 
demonstrate wastewater from the LWRF has been affecting Maui’s west 
coast. An NPDES permit would effectively prevent that and thwart the goal 
of the CWA to restore and maintain the integrity of American waters.124   
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POLLUTION PROBLEMS IN PARADISE 
306 
 
The County could appeal the lower court’s decisions, which seems 
likely given the County’s reluctance to comply with the CWA. Years of 
pressure and litigation have not stopped the County yet. And while the 
County spokesperson said the administration could not comment on pending 
legal issues, it would be difficult to believe that the County is done fighting 
this matter. How the appeal process plays out likely depends on the instant 
court’s interpretation and expansion of the CWA and its creation and 
application of the conduit test.  
The most significant part of the instant court’s decision is its 
expansion of the term “navigable waters” to include groundwater that serves 
as a conduit to navigable-in-fact waters – in this case, the aquifer leading to 
the Pacific Ocean.125 Never before had the CWA been interpreted in such a 
matter. However, the court’s interpretation seems a logical evolution of the 
statutory language of the CWA. Had the LWRF discharged the effluents 
directly into the ocean, it would not even be a question whether the County 
was violating the CWA. The County’s argument that groundwater, as the 
conduit here, would diffuse the pollutants and minimize their effects is 
similar to its argument that the vastness of the ocean makes it a viable 
dumping ground. These arguments fail to take into account cumulative and 
local effects of the pollutants. In addition, they run counter to the purpose of 
the CWA, which includes protecting the oceans as navigable waters.126 
Allowing the LWRF to continue its waste disposal process would allow the 
County – and other would-be polluters – to successfully circumvent the 
CWA and potentially harm the environment. 
Hawaiians have long revered the oceans and their land. But in the 
centuries since Captain Cook stumbled upon the archipelago, a collection of 
colonists, tourists and businesses have transformed the islands without much 
consideration of the environment. Hawaii is a prime example of a place that 
can benefit from the CWA, and this case is a prime example of how. The reef 
along Kahekili Beach Park, the area affected by the discharge of pollutants, 
comes right up to the shore.127 The plaintiffs claim that the effects of the 
effluents are evident. Coral reefs are fragile ecosystems. To prevent any 
                                                
125 Haw. Wildlife Fund, No. 12 Civ. 00198, supra note 114. 
126 Rapanos v. U.S., 547 U.S. 715, 739 (2006). 
127 Kahekili Beach Park, MAUI GUIDEBOOK (July 15, 2009), 
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further changes in the composition of the reef, the plaintiffs must rely on the 
CWA and the court’s decision to prevent the discharge of effluents. While 
the effects on the Kaheliki Beach Park reef may seem minimal,128 proving 
damage is not necessary for the County to be in violation of the CWA.129 
This makes sense. Forcing a plaintiff to show negative effects prevents a 
plaintiff from prevailing in a CWA suit until damage occurs. The point of the 
CWA is not just to restore but also to maintain. Prevention of destruction is 
synonymous with that goal.  
The plaintiffs also hope the court’s decision has an impact beyond the 
shores of the Hawaiian Islands.130 The district court’s decision is a step in the 
right direction, but the decision has only persuasive authority. Barring a 
Supreme Court decision or federal regulation that determines otherwise, 
groundwater still will not suffice as a navigable water source. If the matter 
does find its way into the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, that court could 
strike down the decision. And while the district court in the instant case 
opens the door for entities to run afoul of the CWA because of polluted 
groundwater, its holding could be construed in a very narrow sense. The 
court itself mentions that the facts in this case are unique.131 Few states 
contain islands with wastewater facilities that discharge effluents into an 
aquifer that makes its way to the oceans or Gulf of Mexico. But one can 
imagine other scenarios where the conduit theory may also apply when 
assessing groundwater for CWA purposes, such as underground tributary 
systems, especially those in caves.132  
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Given the divergence in jurisdictions over the groundwater issue, the 
court in the instant case knew that a higher court might strike down its 
conduit test. For that reason, the court provided some insurance for its 
decision in favor of the plaintiffs by also analyzing the case based on the 
defendant’s test requiring a significant impact on the area subjected to the 
discharge. By doing so, the district court bolstered its chances of not being 
reversed by the higher courts and preserved its decision to make the County 
comply with the CWA.  
The district court’s decision in the instant case puts the County in a 
difficult spot. Trying to find a new place for millions of gallons of reclaimed 
wastewater is not an easy task. Mayor Arakawa noted that the County must 
find a solution while the LWRF is still operational, lamenting, “Do we tell 
everybody don't flush? We have to deal with reality. This water is coming 
in.”133 But the plaintiffs have proposed a solution – re-using the water for 
golf courses, resorts, agricultural fields and other developments.134 West 
Maui desperately needs fresh water thanks to a “near permanent drought.”135 
Arakawa also said the solution to the problem could be a partnership with 
Anaergia Services, which would use the wastewater to revitalize about 2,000 
acres of West Maui's fallow farmlands to grow sorghum, a biocrop that could 
be used to generate electricity.136 However, those talks have stalled.137 
Whatever the County decides, it will likely be a costly endeavor.  
Provided that the County does not manage to obtain an NPDES 
permit or win on appeal of the district court’s decisions, these could be 
effective – albeit likely expensive – alternatives to releasing the water into 
the aquifer. The County would not be in the position to find better 
alternatives had the court not found that groundwater in this instance suffices 
as navigable waters. By applying the conduit theory, the court made a logical 
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expansion of the CWA that furthers the act’s goals. Whether the court’s 
decision stands and this expansion is upheld remains to be seen. If the County 
succeeds in obtaining a permit or winning an appeal,138 it will be a loss for 
the Hawaiian environment. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Clean Water Act prohibits the discharge of effluents into 
navigable waters from a point source without a National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System permit. For decades, the County of Maui has discharged 
millions of gallons of treated wastewater into an aquifer, and the plaintiffs 
indisputably have proven this wastewater makes its way into the ocean. The 
only question the court needed to address was whether the groundwater in the 
aquifer qualified as “navigable.” In response, the court found that 
groundwater serving as a conduit to navigable-in-fact water satisfied that 
requirement. By reaching this conclusion, the district court has furthered the 
purpose of the CWA to restore and maintain the nation’s waters. The 
reclaimed wastewater now can be used to benefit the land, and the 
degradation of the reefs of Kaheliki Beach Park can cease. The precedent set 
here by the court provides the guidelines for a wiser interpretation of the 
CWA. But whether other courts – or even the County – will fall in line with 
the instant court’s holding remains to be seen. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
138 At the time of publication, the County’s appeal is still pending. 
